Auctions provide an &icient way of resolving one-to-many negotiations. This is particularly true for automated agents where delays and long communications carry negative externalities. A properly designed auction, tailored to the specific needs of the relevant multi-agent system, can significantly improve its performance.
1 Introduction .4utononlous agents are increasingly being required to operate in open, dktnbuted systems comprising multiple problem solvers with competing objectives. In such situations, agents need to interact with one another in order to procure services and to manage their action interdependencies. As the agents are autonomous and because they often represent dMerent organizations or individuals, the predominant form of interaction is negotiation. Thus, the agents decide for themselves which actions to pursue, for whom and under what terms and conditions. Only if they are convinced of the value of a particular course of action will they act towzwd its achievement.
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ac. uk development. There are, however, many different types of negotiation scenario which can be encountered (variables include the number of agents involved in the process, whether the negotiation is cooperative or competitive, and whether the agents repeatedly encounter one another) and each variation typically requires a different model. Moreover, there are a number of fundamentally different methods of approach to modelling negotiation -emanating from fields such as Artificial Intelligence (e.g. Kraus (1997) , Mueller (1996) ), Social Psychology (e.g. Pruitt (1981 Pruitt ( , 1993 , Raiffa (1982) ), and Economics (e.g. Kreps (1990) , Binmore (1992) ). What this melting pot of ideas shows clearly is that there is no universally applicable model and no universal best technique.
Here we are interested in a particular class of negotiations -namely, those where there is one buyer and many potential sellers. For this set of scenarios, we seek to devise a negotiation model which is fast and efficient and which can bc easily implemented in a computational system. We chose to base our model on auction theory, since this is widely recognised by economists as the most efficient way of resolving one-to-man: negotiations [see, for example, Moore (1992) ]. ThB is particularly true for automated agents where delays and long communications can carry negative externalities, in additional to their usual dkect negative effect on agents' utilities.
In this paper we focus on the specific problem of service allocation amongst autonomous, automated agents. The negotiation work is motivated by, and demonstrated on, a realworld problem from the domain of business process management. The particular problem we consider is taken from the ADEPT project (Jennings et al (1996) ) and concerns an exemplar BT (British Telecom) business process for providing a quote for &signing a network for a customer.1
In this application, autonomous agents represent the distinct actors involved in the process -thus, there are agents which represent the customer service division, the legal department, the design department and so on. These agents are conceptualized as providing services to one another. In order to be able to vend a particular service, an agent often requires an acquaintance to provide a related sub-service. Since the agents are autonomous, the means through which such sub-services are provisioned is negotiation. In this case, lAlthough couched ill terms of a particular business process management problem, we believe the scenario is common to a broad range of domains in wbicb agents negotiate over the terms and conditions under which task allocation will occur (see Sierra et al (1997) for more details).
Thus. the solution proposed in this paper is not just limitrd to the specific application we describe.
nq,otiatiou amounts tO dct crminiug which agent shonkf provide the desired sub-service and under what terms and conditions. One of the key elements of thfi application is a one-to-many, competitive rmgotiation forout-sotrrcing a particul<arpart of the business procrs.. Since th= interaction is cm mrc of the bnsine.<sproc~<s-main paths, it requires an efficient solution if the overall application is to be effective. Hence the interest in finding the most appropriate negotiation model. Themainc ontributionso fthispapera rethreefokl. First, we show how a standard English auction protocol can be modYied for services, which are multi-dimensional private value objects. Second, we devise a novel protocol -which: under certain conditions (which we specify), aflo-wsauctions to be arranged by the service providing agents, in the cases where the service seeking agents fail to do so-We consider the incentives of all participants, and show how such an arrangement can be in all their best interests. Fkmlly, by examining our results for what is, essentially, an application of mechanism design to a computational setting, we draw some general conclusions on how the key concepts can be operationahzed in automated agents.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 briefly describes the ADEPT system, and in particular focuses on the service allocation requirements dictated by our red-world application-Section 3 provides some background on auction design and outlines criteria for what is, and what is not, an efficient protocol-Section 4 describ= the protocol for a nmlti-dimensional version of an English auction, designed by us for the ADEPT system. In th= section we also provide some general results regarding the outcome and efficiency of our protocoL In section 5, a "pm-auction" agreement, organized by the service-providing agents, is described. We give an example of such a protocol and show when it could be used to increase e.fliciency. Section 6 discusses the application of our analysis to the design of interacting agents in generaL Section 7 presents related work and section 8 concludes.
The ADEPT System
The ADEPT system provides a general fki.rnework and architecture for business process management which has been deployed in a range of real-world settings. Here we focus on one of these applications -namely, that of providing a quote for designing a network which provides particular services for a customer. The overall process receives a customer service request as its input and generates as its output a quote specifying how much it would cost t.o build a network to re tilze that service. The complete application involves up to six agent types (Jennings et al (1996) ); however here we focus on the negotiation behveen only two types. The agents we consider are the customer service division agent which is responsible for managing the quote process for BT and the vet customer agents which are responsible for providing the out-sourced service of checking the customers who require quotes. The vetting of customers is an important aspect of the business process because if a customer is deemed unsatisfactory (for whatever reason) then a quote will not be provided.
Three are a number of externaf organizations (typically het.ween 5 and 10) who can provide the vet customer service to BT and they compete abtinst one another to win the vet customer contract. In more detail, the negotiation between the customer service division agent (the servkescekmg agent) and the vet customer agents (the semice-2 providing agents) exhibits the following properties:
(1) The vet customer service is provided by more than one agent. Some of the agents offer icfcntical services, while others offer services which vary idong several dimensions (e.g. quality, price, availability, ct.c.).
(2) The customer service and vet. customer agents rcl>-rfient different organizations and hence the negotiation is competitive in nature.
(3) The set of vetting agents remains reasonably stable (hence negotiators repeatedly encounter one another), but new agents can enter the market and existing ones can leat,e.
(4) Negotiations rauge over a number of quantitative (e.g. price, duration, and cost) and qualitative (e.g. type of reporting policy, and nature of the contract) issues. Each successful negotiation requires a range of such issues to be resolved to the satisfaction of both parties. Agents may be required to make trade-offs between issu= (e.g. faster completion time for lower quality) in order to come to an agreement.
(5) As the agents are autonomous, the factors wtilch influence their negotiation stance and behaviour are private and not available to their opponents. Thus, agents do not know what utilities their opponents place on various outcomes, they do not know what reasoning models they employ, they do not know their opponent's constraints and they do not know whether an agreement is even possible at the outset (i.e. the participants may have non-intersecting ranges of acceptability).
(6) Time is an important consideration. Timings are important on two distinct levels (i) the time it takes to reach an agreement must be reasonable and (ii) the time by which the negotiated service must be executed is important in most cases and crucial in others. The former means that the agents should not become involved in unnecessarily complex and time consuming negotiations -the time spent negotiating should be reasonable with respect to the value of the service agreement. The latter means that the agents sometimes have hard deadlines by which agreements must be in place (this occurs mainly when multiple services need to be combined or closely coordinated).
Given this set of requirements, we need to design an appropriate negotiation protocol (mechanism) which ensures services are allocated efficiently and effectively. In our case, thii involves taking the mechanism which best fits our needs, adapting it to give the desired properties and degree of efficiency, and then determining how it can be used by computational agents.
Designing Efficient Mechanisms
This section discusses the issues involved in designing an efficient auction protocol for automated agents operating in an open multi-agent system. This involves defining the criteria against which the protocol will be judged (section 3.1), determining those issues that arise over and above the standard ones because we are dealing with software agents not humans (section 3.2), and indicating how the uncertainty inherent in our negotiation scenarios can be dealt with (section 3.3). Finafly, given this background, we motivate our choice of an English Auction Protocol to handle the ADEPT scenario (section 3.4).
Evaluation Criteria
In order to compare two negotiation mechanisms, some assumptions about the behaviour of agents arc necesmry In the economic literature, the usual methocl of COmparing different negotiation mechanisms (or protocols) is to~xam-ine some facet of the set of Nash-Equilibria of the games specified by these mechanisms (h400re (1992)). A NashEquilibrium is a state where each of the players best-respond to the collection of the other players' strategies. For aYarnple, in a protocol where two negotiating agents are required to simultaneously demand what share they should be getting from a given sum of money, a pair of demands constitutes a Nash Equilibrium if and only if, the shares demanded sum up to one (because the bast response to any suggested share, is to demand one minus that share). Implicitly, getting to a Nash equilibrium generally requires that players are rational, in the sense that they act in such a way to maximize their goals, and that this rationaEty is common knowledge (for a more detailed discussion see Binmore (1992) : or Moore (1992)). That is, each agent knows that its opponent is a utility maximizer, that its opponent knows that it is a utility "maximizer, that it knows that its opponent knows, ad infirtitum. However, as we explain later in this paper, some mechanisms, like the ones suggested by us, make more moderate assumptions on the rationality of agents whkh are better suited to computationally bounded systems.
When considering notions like utility maximisation it is important to distingn-kh between private and wmmon value objects. The worth of a private value object to a bidder de pends only on hts own preferences. In contrast, the value, to a bidder, of a common value object depends on the preferences of the other bldders2. A service in a multi-agent environment has private value if the oply utility it carries for the service-seeking agent is from consuming it. Conversely, if the agent is allowed to m-sell the service, then it has common value. Since information regarding the credit rating of a potential customer cannot (legally) be d=tributed, ADEPT's customer service agent cannot m-sell the service. In this paper, we therefore restrict attention to private value auctions. However, note that the outcomes of private and common value auctions differ in general, and some of the results in this paper will need to be modified for a multi-agent system where m-sale of services is allowedWith these basic constructs in place, we can now return to the issue of mechanism evaluation. For our purposes, there are two important criteria that need to be considered. Firstly, the expected revenue, or utility, of the auctioneeringour setting, this equates to the utility the buyer receives, in equilibrium, from the service specified by the winning bid. The second metric relates to the mechanism's allocative efficiency, or efficiency in general-In our setting, th= translates to comparing the sum of the utilities of all bidders, or to the question of whether the winner is the service-provider whkh could offer the best service for the buyer whilst still profiting born suih an agreement. If communications are expensive (we cart think of the direct costs of communicating between agents, or a slight preference for agreements closer in time), efficient~so means fast (see Binmore (1992) ).
Multi-Agent Specific Considerations
There are several ways in which mechanism design for multiagent systems differs from that for multi-person environments (see, for example, Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994 ), .%ndholm and Lesser (1995 ), %ndholm (1996 , and Binmore & Vukt.n (1997) (1994) for more details about these auctions). Here companies compete for licenstzsin different cities and states. A crucial feature of the design of these auctions is that birlders cannot communicate to each other the destinations they would like to have. It was reported that in one of the recent auctions, one of the bidders submitted a surprisingly low bid (low enough to ensure that it will not win), and that the last few digits of amount bidded were identical to the telephone code of the area it was after. .Although this uzas not coordinated between bidders in advance, the signal was correctly interpreted by the other players, and the revenue generated was significantly lower than what was originally anticipated. At least with existing technology, computerized agents are unlikely either to be capable of generating such subtle signals or of interpreting them even if they are produced. Another positive difference is that mechanisms will be executed quickly. Moreover, as the number of agents is relatively small, we do not have to worry about timing of messages (cf large scale auctions over a distributed system, like the Internet (Rodriguez et al (1997) )). On the negative side however, automated agents' knowledge basin are inherently bounded: they cannot initiate a mechanism unlass they are specifically designed to do so. Also, the idea that agents always best-respond, which in many simple situations is reasonable for humans, is questionable for automated agents. The other major difference when designing for a muk.iagent system is that the system is open in nature. Traditional mechanism design analysis only compares the outcomes of a given set of mechanisms. In other words, mechanisms are taken as given. However, in an open system: where the type of future participating agents is still unknown, we may wish to consider the incentives of agents to initiate a mechanism. Specifically we consider (i) the conditions under which a service seeking or service provider agent will choose to initiate a particular mechanism, and (ii) the knowledge base automated agents will be required to have in order to decide that a certain mechanism is desirable in a given situation. We address the former question in sections 4 and 5, and the latter in section 6.
Coping with Uncertainty
In most multi-agent systems, service-seeking and serviceproviding agents are uncertain about the valuation systems of their opponents.3 In such situations the behaviour of each agent is, in general, determined by its beliefs about the behaviour of the other agents. More specifically, in our setting, the behaviour of a bidding agent clearly depends on its beliet%regarding the valuation systems of other bidders. An immediate consequence is that the outcome of the chosen mechtiism/protocol may depend on the collection of these beliefk outcomes are a function of bejiefs. This has to be taken into account when we evaluate the efficiency (or any of the other criteria mentioned~bove) of such a mechanism. Several evaluation premises could be considered: given the distribution of beliefs (or the modeller a priori beliefs about beliefs) we could compute an average outcome, with respect to beliefs, or we could restrict attention to worst-case scenarios". Since W' need more assumptions to discuss averages, we focu* iU this paper on the lat~cr-However, some of t.hcremits, .%WC! point out in section 4, will still go through in the average-ollt.come case. By worst-case scenario, wc have in mind something similar to the notion of worst-case algorithmic conlplcxity. Thus we will consider the outcome when participants' beliefs are such thatthey minimize the efficiency of the mechanism we will put forward.
However, in many situations it is possible to construct mechanisms where the outcome does not depend on beliefs. A belie~-independrmt mechanism exists when outcomes depend on the behaviour of a sub-set of agents (at least one, and possibly all) which have a dominant strategy. A dominant strategy is one whkh yields a (expected) payoff which is higher than the other strategies uhf ever the behaviour of the other players and the state of the world. For example, in the prisoners' dilemma a player prefers to defect if the other player cooperates, and prefers to defect if the other player defects. Defecting is, therefore, a dominant strategy.
Dominant strategiw have several desirable properties when applied to automated agents. Fwst, they permit a much weaker form of rationality -a pIayer should never play a strategy whkh is dominated. This last statement can be easily represented in the knowledge base of an automated agent. In fact, assuming that thii simple fact is commonly known to all agents ensures that agents will play the equilibrium in a large set of games (Pearce (1984))-If agents can reach the equilibrium by elknination of dominated strategies, then this can be done with relatively little counterspeculation about what the other players will do. Given the complexity of knowledge representation induced by such counter-speculations, mechanisms which rely on dominant strategies are clearly desirable. Second, think of the behavionr of rational agents (i-e. utility maximizers) if, for some reason, the system is invaded by one or more 'irrational" agents. -A mechanism which relies only on domin~t strategies will be robust to such an event, since opt-knal actions are independent of the behaviour of the other players. However, this is uot the case in situations where what is optimal depends on the actions of others. In the latter case, agents will hold and update beliefk regardhg the rationfllty of the other agents, and will act accordingly (by, for example, ta.khg advantage of the irrational agents). This kind of behaviour in turn, could reduce the overall efficiency of the system. For these reasons, we seek to design an auction protocol for the -4DEPT scenario based upon agents selecting dominant strategies.
Choosing a Particular Auction Protocol
Perhaps the most common auctions mechanisms are (i) a Dutch auction, where the auctioneer continuously Iowers the price until a bidder accepts the price and the auction terminates, (ii) an Engliih (or First-Price, Open Cry) auction, where the auctioneer raises the price until there is only one taker for that price, (iii) a first-price sealed bid auction} where bids are made simultaneously and the highest bid wins the auction and where that bid is taken as the agreed price, and (iv) a Vickrey auction, where simultaneous sealed bids are made. The winner is the agent with the highest bid, but he only pays the second highest bid. Although it is possible that, under some conditions, all four auction mechanisms are revenue equivalent for a private-value object (e.g. h[oore (1992)), only two (Engliih and Vickrey auctions) rely 'Alternatively.
any comb] nati on of the two measurements can be considered.
4 on agents playing their dominant strategies As indicated in section 3.3, this has important conceptual and pragmatic arivantagek. The reason for choosing the English auction over the Vickrcy auction is that it is more robust with respect to changing circu instances Suppose now, that in some situations, services can lx re-sold (or more generally, that there are some externalities (e.g. the fact that agent i had won the auction, has an indirect effect on agent 31sutility) in the process of service provision). The object (i.e. the service) is no longer of private value, and the equivakmce theorem no longer holds. In particular, the choice of a Vickrey auction is no longer likely to be optimal (Moore (1992)). But an English auction is still revenue superior in a very large class of situations, because the information revealed during the auction ensures that bidders will move closer to their reservation prices (Moore (1992)). Given this background, in the next section we describe a mechanism for service allocation suitable for the ADEPT application, based on a multi-dimensional English auction. We show that our choice of mechanism relies on dominant strategies, promotes truth, revealing from the side of the service-seeking agent, and can be executed quickly.
A First-Price, Open-Cry Auction Protocol for ADEPT
In this section we design a new protocol for service allocation in the ADEPT scenario. Our protocol represents an extension of the standard English auction in that it is multi-dmensional. We provide a specification of the implementation of such a protocol, and re-derive the usurd efficiency results. In particular, we show that our protocol will choose the service provider which can make the best offer, in terms of the buyer's utility. We also show that the buyer will then choose to report its true utility (i.e. the way it weights the different attributes of the service). Finally, we show that the protocol maximises the worst-case outcome for the buyer (see section 3.3).
Multi-dimensional auctions add new conlplexity to the auctioning process, because sellers (and buyers for that matter) now typically have different preference weighings. This implies that the service provider which can make the best offer is not necessarily the one that offers the lowest price. Rather it is the one that offers the combination most suitable for the buyer's needs. That is, for fixed prices, different buyers will prefer different service providers. This is in sharp contrast to the one dintensional case, where the best-price is preferred by all. Still, as we demonstrate (section 4.2), it is possible to get similar ,-eficiency results for a suitably motlfied version of the Enghsh auction protocol. We, therefore, begin with definitions of multi-dimensional services and preferences (section 4.1).
Defining the Protocol
Services: We describe a service as a pair: (p, 3) where p is a real number corresponding to the price of the service, and 3 a vector of real numbers s = (s1, .s2,... J .$N Where s, = q is a measurement of the quality of the service , and .22to SN arc optional additional dhnensions of the same service (such as time before service can be provided, level of support, etc.).
Preferences of the service-seeking (SS) agent (or "Buyer" ): We assume that the as-agent's preferences can 'We assume that. the quality of a service can be described by a real number and that this measurement is commonly known to all players.
he tkscrilmcl IIVa rpa..z-hcur utdzfy JuncfionG UB (3) -p: A COX]tiIIUOUS~lld differmlt.iablc function which, we~~umc, is increasing with the quality of t.hc sen-icc agreed,~> 0. The s.-agent's spending on the service is restricted by some real number yo. It maim economic sense, certainly within the context of ADEPT, to assume that ?lB is concave. In consumer theory, this is known as the law of diminishing marginal rates of substitution: to hold utility constant, dL minishing quantities of one attribute of the service must be sacrificed to obtain successive eqtraf increases in the quantities of the other attributes (see, for exunple, Binmorc (1992) or any rnicroeconomic textbook for more details).
Cost structure of service providers (SP) (or "Sellers" or "Bidders"):
The costs to asp-agent i, from a service F and a price p can be expressed by a continuous and differentiable function ci (3) +p, with~<0. Moreover, we assume that the cost functions faced by service providers are such that, for each Sj where~<0 then~~O and vice versa for the service sellers.~hat is, the s~agent's preferences move in opposite directions to those of the buyer. This assumption is not restrictive suppose that there are some variables that buyers and seflers prefer more (aft. less) of. Then, those variables can be excluded from the anafysis above, with the outcome remaining unchanged. We assume further that~i (-) are convex (or diminishing marginaf returns of the cost function)-This assumption is taken for thẽ samereasons, and in the same vein, as the previous assumption on dlminiihlng rates of substitution.
The Protocol: ' Z lnitiatiorx The process begins with an announcement from the ss-agent. An announcement consists of the following liit {F'lWC,~B(~),~o, mi, T, -Y) where FPOC describes the type of auction which the ss-agent is about to use, in our case, FPOC or first-price open-cr~~=B is the buyer's dccl.ared utility function (but in general UB need not be the real utility UB(3)); fio is the maximal amount the buyer is willing to pay for the service (and again: jO can be in general different from po); mi (optional) is the minimaf acceptance level for OfferS,i.e. offers S such that.~B (~i) < mi will not bc considere~T is the ma~imal time (in seconds) the buyer wilf wait for a new ofier before accepting the~~isting onq and finally, X is the percentage figure hy which a new offer has to exceed the last offer in order t-ube considered. Formally, given the last acceptable offer F,. a new offer, Ft+1 will be considered ifl %@& > 1 + -Y. Ifote that although the as-agent is allowed to lie about the~ahres of UB(3) and p. we will show that this will not happen in equilibrium. 11. Auctiotz Once sp-agents receive the announcement they can submit offers -where an offer is simply a vector 3 as defined above. An offer is accepted providing that (1) the protocol dld not terminate, and (2) the offer exceeds the last offer by at least X7 percent. When an acceptable offer is submitted, it is made public by the buyer (who acts as the auctioneer in the more conventional version of an English auction), together with the identity of the bidder.
111. ?'crminatiorx The auction terminatrx T seconds after the last acceptable ofTer was made.
End of Protocol.
61LiSXStttlltxfthat these preferences an. idc*%ticaI to those of the .agcnt's user. or that the user never Iics to Ilis mm agent. The idea bchiml this assumption is that the agent mill do the lying on behalf of its user. irlhis could bc bmmficial.
See 13inmorc and VulkaI] (1997) fm a discussion of this .aasumptirm.
Tfle role of T should bc obvious from t.llc above termination condition. Of course, T hzs to he long enough for an interested sp-agent to be able to carry out. its calculations and submit an offer. Since this is the only mason why it has to be long, we set T to be the smalkx$t time interval which satisfies the above conciition'. X, like T, is derived from practical considerations: Typically, the ss-agent has to get the service before some dcad]inc (section 2). Although the agent does not discount the future by some continuous factor (as in most one-to-one bargaining models, where time discounting enters directly to the agents' utility functions), nevertheless it prefers mechanisms where agreements can be reached in a known, finite time. If bidders are aflowed to increase existing offers by any amount, a situation where offers increase by a decreasing percentage cannot be rufed out. In theory, these increments can become smaller and smafler and convergence might be extremely slow (afthough it is not in the interest of any of the players). Fixing X will clearly prevent such undesirable scenarios. Note, though, that fixhrg -X > 0 may mean that the ss-agent could lose out some of its surplus in the following scenario: Suppose that the current offer is F=. Suppose further, that some bidder,~, is able to offer a slightly better service to the buyer, 3', where UD(3') > uB (3T), but <1 +X.
Then i will not bid and, if 3= is accepted, the buyer could have been better-off if i bid.
Analysis of the Protocol
The following simple Lemma is usefuI for the rest of our anafysis: Lemma 1 Under the above assumptions, there exists a unique solution, 3', to the following constraint ma..imization problem for sp-agent Z may uB (-) subject to ci (-), and p < po.
Proof. Let S~i,, = {F I ci(~) = -po}.
For the given price Po, Smin represents the set of all services for which service provider i is indifferent between providing and not-providing for that price. From continuity, 3' must lie on Sl"ill (otherwise we should be able to move closer to Sillin while i still makes positive profits). For every real number k, consider the set {UB(3) = k}, what is known in economics as the buyer's indifferent curve,. or in our setting the set of all services that are worth exactly p + k to the buyer. Given the convexity/concavity assumptions, there exists a unique reaf number~such that S,,li,, is tangential to the indifferent curve ILB(S) = k. see figure 1 for an ilhrstration of these curves in the case where F is two dimensional. Given the direction of the buyer's preferences the point where the two above curves are tangential mzcximizes his utility. This unique point on the services' space is therefore 3'. 0 Lemma 1 describes the best possible agreement, to the buyer, that service provider i could offer for the given price. However, to expect to extract such an agreement in equilibrium is unrealistic, ,as the provider is primarily concerned with minimizing his own costs (and not with maimizing the buyer's utility as in the proof of lemma I), and will therefore try to win the auction with the service which does just 'Unlike a one-to-one bargaining situation, where dc]ays plays a significant strategic role: hS not accepting OfTers immediate l?. a Pla.vcr is signaling that he is patient, which in turn, i"cre.wcs his bargaining power.
However, ill our setting, if a provider wishes LO ofrer more than the existinx offer. it fms no incentive to wail Sot.. for cxaml] le. Admati and Per; (19g7).
regardless of their beliefs. Given that, we show next that the .ss-agent will prefer to report to the sp-agents his true utility and price constraint (whereas in one-to-one negotiations such a revelation is very unlikely, as revealing one's private information weakens its bargaining power).
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, the .ss-agent will announcẽ B(-) =~B(-) and fio = PCI.
\

Proof.
Given the behaviour, in equilibrium. of the sn-
F@re 1: Buyers best possible agreement.
that. As we show next, the best that the buyer can do, is to eixtract from the winner, a service which is (slightly higher than) the second-best. Formally, Proposition 1 The auction will be won by sp-agent j, where UB(3 ) > u~(3') Vi # js, and the winning bid, F is such that UB(? ) = (1 +X) -?@ (3E), where # satisfies
Proof.
(By reductio ad absnrdum) Suppose, on the contrary, that agent 1 # j wins the auction. Since UB(~-) > 71D (Si) Vi # j by assumption, then~B (~") > UB(S1). From the definitions of 3" and~, sp-agent j receives a higher utility from winning with~than from losing the auction, and 1 cannot submit a better bid than~. j will therefore profitably deviate by bidding~which will result in him winning the auction.
It should be clear that j has no incentive to bid anything which yields the buyer more utility than F" (recall our assumption that the buyer's preferences are opposed to those of the sp-agents. Any agreement -which improves the utility of the buyer will therefore decrease the utility of the seller). Suppose now that j wins the auction with a lower bid, F"" (where @(~-) <~B ( 3-)). Then sp-agent k could win (or, at a minimum, tie) the auction by liddlng #-Hence our result.
u
In fact, in an English auction it is a dominant strategy for bidders to increase their bids (with respect to~B until 3'). Proposition 1 shows, therefore, that the buyer can expect to retract the "second best" service from the bidders, 'Providing zhatU. (F") > min. That is, providing that the "best" olTer is acceptable.
Otherwise, none of the oflers is acceptable and the service will not be provided.
'That is. sp.agent k would have won the auction if j did not participate.
.
agents, the as-agent will receive utility '~fr(S") wl~ichis clearly m~ximized by choosing ;E (.) = UB (-) . Suppose now that the service is agreed for PI < PO. Then given the 'opposite direction of the cost functions and UB, and the continuity assumption on both, there is an c environment which contains services with costs p, PI < p < PO for which @ is strictly increased. The as-agent is therefore better-off announcing ;0 = po. o Given the results from Propositions 1 and 2, we are now able to prove that the protocol is, in some sense, optimal: Proposition 3 The above protocol maximizes the beliefsworst-case revenue for the buyer.
In the game where UB and the cj are commonly known, the equilibrium outcome cannot exceed ZB (3"). Consider now any protocol P'(z) in which the outcome (may) depend on the collection of beliefk. Let P'(~T) denote the outcome of the protocol when all players place probability 1 on the true wdues Of ci. C1emly UB(P'(~T)) < ZLB (3-) because, given their beliefs, none of the bidders will have an incentive to offer a "better" service for a price p < po. By definition, belief-worst-case outcome, uB (p'(~))
is not greater than~B (P'(~T)). Hence our result.
u In fact, with more work, it is possible to prove a stronger version of Proposition 3, namely that under a large class of distributions of beliefs (including the uniform distribution), the above protocol also maximizes the average-case outcome. Notej however, that in order to prove such claims, we need to make further assumptions about the risk-attitudes of spagents (because the utility of an average is equal, smaller or greater than, the average utility depending on the risk attitude of the agent). Still, 'it is easy to see from the proof of Proposition 3, that it will still work as long as the average belief does not imply over-optimism, in the sense that sellers are likely, on average, to under estimate the cost structures of their opponents.
To summarize, Propositions 1-3 show that it is in the best interest of the buyer to use the suggested protocol in order to ensure the best possible outcome for itself. No other mechanism, whether it is based on an auction or on direct negotiations, will yield a better outcome for the service seeker. Moreover, the mechanism chosen is robust against changing circumstances, and since it is expressed in multidimensional terms, is applicable for a large set of services.
A Pre-Auction Agreement Protocol
The previous section dealt with the case of an auction initiated by a service-seeking agent. Since the protocol provides an efficient method for the ss-agent to agree a service, it is likely that it. will opt for an auction as it is typically better
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off in an auction th~l in a siluat Ion of simultaneous negotiations with sellers.' 0. Our goal in dlis section, however, is to show that if for some reason the sem-ice-seeking agent fails to initiate such a protocol, it might still be in the interest of the sp-agents to do so. Hem we assume that the default interaction mechanism is direct negotiations. Th= is the case, not only in ADEPT, but in any nther multi-agent system whkh allows for both one-to-one and one-to-many bargaining. We identify the conditions under which the sp-agents might decide that some sort of auctioning is required, and we dkcuss one particular mechanism which these agents can employ, and which does not hurt the buyers.
Consider the current state of affairs in ADEPT where the ss-agents are already endowed with a number of bargaining techniques. These agents are afso familiar with the set of possible vet customer agents competing to provide them services. 'Quite often, the service which is agreed on does not differ much horn the one that would have been agreed in the English auction described in the previous section. Moreover, in ADEPT a single service constitutes only a small fraction of the vet customer agents' turnover. The benefits to an spagent from not having to participate in an auction (namely the probability the agent attaches to the event of it timing the auction although it cannot offer the best possible ser--vice for that price, or the probabdity attached to winning the auction with a service which is less costly), are therefore small. Moreover, one-to-one negotiations are, almost by definition, longer and require more communications between the negotiating agents (in ADEPT, like in most multi-agent systems, negotiations are primarily a process of offers and counter-offers). The number of communication channels is limited, and long negotiations with one ssagent could delay negotiations -with oth= such agents, who might turn elsewhere in the meantime. From this, together with the additional assumptions on time chscounting and deadlines, it should be clear that, for a fixed outcome, a fast mechanism is preferred. If, like in ADEPT, the benefit from dkect negotiations is small, then an auction could be preferred by the sp-agents for even rdatively small communication costs and time discountingll.
5.1
Defining the Protocol
In ADEPT, as in many other existing multi-agent systems, auctions are always initiated by the ss-agent. If an ss-agent, however good in negotiating deals on behalf of its user, does not know how to initiate an English auction, or if it fails to detect that it is appropriate, then costly one-to-one negotiations will continue. Denote this as Condition 1. Next, denote by Condition 2 the situation where the fine details of the service need to be fiualized ajter one sp-agent is selected (this is typically the case where the setting of the final de tails of the lid are expensive)-For situations where either of the above conditions hold, the following mechanism could prove beneficial
The "pre-auction" protocol:
lo~nmore ( 1. Initiation: AI sp-agent approached by an ss-agent. (where either conditions (1) or (2) apply), announcm a "Prcauction" protocol to the other sp-agcn ts.
11. Pre-Auction: sp-agents compete using an English auction (as in section 4), with the difference that the maxi. ma] price is taken as (1 -A) -PO,where .4 is small (typically 0.01). Denote by 3 the winuing bid, and by i the index of the winning sp-agent.
111. Negotiations: i makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the ss-agent of service 3-for a price of po (in equilibrium the offer will be accepted). All other sp-agent do IIOt negotiate with the s-agent. W. Insurance: i then pays the other n sp-agents, A-po/7i for their cooperation.
Analysis of the Protocol
For the above protocol we are able to prove the following results:
Proposition 4 Given the above protocol; (i) sp-agents will participate in the pre-auction, (ii) i will make a take-it-orIeav&it offer 3., at a price PO (W) the ss-agent will accept, and (iv) afl sp-agents, other than i, will not negotiate with the as-agent.
Proof. Given that the sp-agent who is able to offer the best pos.+ble service (as in Lemma 1), wins the auction, none of the losing parties will have an incentive to start negotiations with the as-agent. Given that the winning bid is~. (as defined in Proposition 1), the ss-agent's best response is to accept the take-it-or-leave-it offer immediately, The additioriaf incentives (the insurance payment) are necessary to ensure that each sp-agent is better-off participating in the pre-auction. Finally, the proof regarding the winning spagent and the winning bld is identical to that of Proposition 1. n
In Proposition 4 we showed that in equilibrium, the prcauction protocol will result in an efficient outcome. Next we show that under conditions 1 or 2, this provides sufficient incentives for the sp-agents to initiate such a protocol.
Proposition
5 If communication is costly, or if sp-agents d~count time, then the allocative efficiency will be increased by using the pre-auction mechanism.
Compare the outcome of the pre-auction protocol with that of direct negotiations (which may depend on the belief% of bidders). From the proof of Proposition 1 it is clear that the aflocative efficiency of bidders (excluding the ss-agent) cannot decrease by using a protocol with an efficient outcome. The utility of the as-agent from direct negotiations is at most A -UB(? ) higher than it receives when the pre-auction protocol is used. But if either conditions 1 or 2 hold, then the utility of at least one (and possibly all) sp-agents is increased by using the protocol. Hence our result. c1
In this section we showed how it is possible to ovcrcomc inefficiencies caused either by costly bidding, or by the fail-' ure of the ss-agent to initiate an efficient protocol. In such circumstances, it may very well become in the best interest of the service providers to restore efficiency. We show that pm-auction mechanisms provide us with the XUCaIIS to do that. Moreover, our choice of mechanism guarantees also that the interests of the service seeking agent, in addition to the int=c.sts of the service providers, are being kept. This is important, because otherwise service seeking agents may oppose to the outcome of such a mechanism and will pursue better agreements independently, thus reducing efficiency even forthcr. Note that the service seeking agent is slightly worse-off than in the protocol described in the previous section (because of the proportion A which is used to pay for the coopwation of the sp-agents). However, if A is smafl compared to the inefficiencies caused by not using a direct auction, then everyone may be strictly better-off by using our suggested pre-auction mechanism. Because automated agents are inherently bounded, either conditions 1 or 2, as described abovq are likely to occur in open, multi-agent environments. The pre-auction protocol described here could, therefore, provide a simple and efficient way to resolve such problems. The ideas presented in this section represent an important divergence from tradltionaf mechan-km design, where it is assumed that once the protocol has been set all agents behave optimally.
Insights for the Design of Automated Agents
Thii section highlights the gene.d issues involved in takhg the theoretical results from mechanism design studies and using them to structure the design and implementation of practiczil agents. While these insights obviously apply to the ADEPT application d~cussed herein, they also have a much wider scope. In fact, we contend the following thoughts are relevant for all types of negotiation situation where the designer adopts a game theoretic start-point.
Responding to ezisting protocols: One of the main contributions of game-theory is that it provides a classification of negotiation situations based on their underlying strategic form (see, for exarnpIe, Kreps (1990) ). This fact can be exploited by the designers of bounded negotiat-mg agents. Rather than building an elaborate reason-mgmechanism which attcrnpts to best-respond to any unforeseen protocol (undoubtedly a doomed venture!), the designer can use the broad classification of protocols, based on game-theoretic ideas, to indicate the most efficient way of responding in a given situation. Thus, responding becomes a case-base retrieval process, rather than a reason-mg horn first principles idea. As our work suggests, negotiating agents will have to be familiar, at a minimum, with the main types of auctions. hforeover, to successfully participate in auctions, Iiddhlg agents need to distinguish between private and common value objects. However, given the equivalence between the outcomes of many auction types (see Binmore (1992) ), the number of protocols agents will need to know, might be comparatively small (we estimate in the order of 10). The database of cases will include the name of the protocol, the best-response (which, in general, may depend on real-time input, such that can be deduced horn the bidding of other agents), and the anticipated outcome of the agent from following MB best response in the given protocol. Finilly, following what we know about the limitation of auction protocols (see, for example .%ndholm (1996)), we suggest that the entry will also include a Iiit (possibly empty) of conditions which violate the applicability of the hcst-respouse.
Imtmtznrj a profocot Consider the expectations of a negotiating agent regarding the service agreed at the end of the negotiation process. Using the data-base suggested above, the agent can check, at regular intervaIs, whether he expects to be better-off by using any of the mechanisms from that list. If the answer is negative, then clearly the agent has no incentive to change the negotiation protocol. But what if t.br answer is positive? Here the agent needs to know whether it is, technically, possible for it to initiate the preferred protocol. As we showed in section 5, the service-seeking agent is often better-off auctioning its custom. We also showc(] that, in certain circumstances, the service-providing agents will prefer an auction to one-to-one negotiations. However. "a service providing agent cannot force the service-seeking agent to initiate the English auction protocol. But, in such situations, a different protocol, the "pre-auction" protocol, is technically feasible, and will have a very similar desimble outcome. We believe that it is possible for our other rti~u Its to be further generalized in a similar fashion.
Choosing protocols for multi-agent systern.s From the point of view of the designer of a multi-agent system who is concerned primarily with the efficiency of negotiations, wc identify two important selection criteria. First, the choice of protocols should be robust with respect to the degree of rationality of agents. On the extreme, we should prefer protocols which are robust against the presence of non-maximizer agents. But as we explained in section 3, even if agents do maximize the utility functions of their users, bounds on their knowledge representation capabilities couid prevent them from playing the Nash equilibrium of an unforeseen game. Fortunately, protocofs which rely solely on dominant strategies (or on iterated elimination of dominated strategies) require a much simpler knowledge base, and are robust against the presence of bounded and irrational agents. At the risk of repeating ourselvw, we again stress that it is therefore eztrernely important that such protocols will be used in multi-agent systems. Second, protocols which arc robust with respect to changes in circumstances should IJc preferred. In this paper we chose an English auction over to its equivalent Vickrey auction because the latter was shown not to be optimal when the service is no longer of private value. Although this is not the case in the existing ADEPT framework, this choice allows us more flexibility, arguably the most important feature of a successful multi-agent. environment.
Related Work
Rosenscheiu and ZlotKln (1994) were the pioneers of using Game Theory as a tkm-neworkfor modelling multi-agent interactions. They afso promoted the use of mechanism design theory for specifying multi-agent interactions. Our first protocol "can, therefore, be seen as" continuing from their line of work. However our work takes mechanism design a stage further. Rather than using idealised, toy scenarios we have used it in a real-world context with all the concomitant constraints and difficulties that this brings. In a much simpler context, Varian (1996) is an excellent example of how second-price auctions can be generalized for a multipurpose multi-agent system. In the same article, he points out the importance of mechanisms which rely on dominant strategies. As we indicated in section 3.3, this is particularly important for automated agents, where strategic-knowledge representation might othenvise be a problem. Moreover, sertions 5 and 6 suggest that one cannot take the mechanism design literature at face value. Varian, like Rosenschein and Z1otkin, asmmes that agents respond optimally to the given mechanism. We show that this assumption is problematic in the context of an open-for-all, multi-agent environment.. More generally, the economic literature on mechanism design and on auctions is wustand beyond the scope of this section. For a gOOd survey of mechanism design see Moore (1992) , or the relevant chapters of Bimnore (1992) . Varian (1996) and the refmenrxs therein, provide a survey of second-price (or grneraliiied VickreY) auctions.
AS we show in this paper, in order to adapt an exfisting mechanism to a given multi-agent system, it is necessary to try and envisage what problems will arise tlom the implementation. (Lee (1996) is an e--ample for such considerations in the context of group negotiations). In particular, the system must be robust against non-optimizing agents, and should preferably rely on mechanisms where agents use dominant strategies. Specifically, we use a multi-dimensional version of an English auction for the supply of services in ADEPT. When auctioning a mrdti-dimensional object (or a multi-attribute service), knowledge of the rem-vation prices for the different attributes is not sufficient to determine a winner. One has to consider additionally, how the sp-agents weight the different attributes. Th-k is somewhat similar to the idea of auctioning multi-units of a given good, a topic which received some attention in the economic literature (see, for e~arnple hloore (1992), Varian (1996) , or Binmore (1992)). Here, each agent has a reservation price for each unit of consumption (e.g. agent i is willing to pay up to 5 dollars for the first unit of the good, up to 4 for the second unit, and so on)-It is in general not optimal to sell all units to the agent with the higher reservation price for the first, or average unit. Instead, an optimal mechanism will ensure that units are distributed in such a way which maximises the seller's revenue (see Varian (1996) , for a numerical example -whichillustrates the last point)-We believe that such considerations are necessary in order for auction protocols to be implemented in, a general purpose multi-agent system, like ADEPTWe also provide an alternative efficient protocol for the case where the ss-agent fails, for some reason, to initiate it. The idea that agents may fki.il to initiate a mechanism which is beneficial for them is dlen to the economic literature. However, in the context of open multi-agent environments, like the Internet, this must be considered. The pr~auction protocol which we suggest goes some way towards restoring thii lost eflicirmcy. Notice that the insurance payments, which are necessary to make sp-agents better-off participating in the pr~auction, reduce the overall efficiency of this protocol compared to an Engliih auction. However, if these payments are small enough, the protocol still leaves everyone better oiTusing it compared to the option of oneto-one negotiations.
Finally, it should be noted that automated auctions already take place on the Internet12 and that most of them tend to use an English auction. However, this invariably has more to do with the familiarity of the protocol, than with the details of a rigourous analysis, like the one presented in this paper-
Conclusions and Future Work
We presented two examples for efficient negotiation protocols for service allocation in multi-agent systems. Our work is set within the domain of business process management, and is specifically tailored for the requirements of the ADEPT system. Both protocols address the desicicrata laid out in section 2, and the usual efficiency criteria from mechanism design. The first protocol, a multi-dimensional English auction, is shown to be a quick and efficient method for ;s ervice-seeking agent. to achieve its goals, when re-sale of services is not possible. The second protocol is designed for the use of service-providing agents, who are not satisfied with the length and outcome of one-to-one negotiations. This 'pm-auction" agreement is shown to be efficient under the same set of criteria. Finally, we draw some general conclusions on how negotiating agents might be designed to take into account the multi-farious results from Game Theory and mechanism design. In an open environment, it seems highly unlikely that negotiating agents will be able to calculate their best-response to any protocol they might encounter. Instead, we suggest a classification system, based on equivalence conditions from mechanism design. We clescribe some of the properties of such a classifying system, and show that it can also be used as the basis of decisions whether to initiate protocols. For the future, we seek to extend our analysis of negotiation services to the more difficult one-to-one case (under the same set of constraints discussed in this paper). Second, we intend to start implementing negotiating agents, in line with the philosophy of section 6. We will then compare the relative merits of the heuristic approach currently employed in ADEPT, with the game theoretic approach advocated herein, in order to ascertain the operational strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches.
